







Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.rollins.edu/as_facpub
Part of the Buddhist Studies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Rollins Scholarship Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an
authorized administrator of Rollins Scholarship Online. For more information, please contact rwalton@rollins.edu.
Published In
D’Amato, Mario. “Buddhism, Apophasis, Truth,” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2008): 17-29.
  












ccording to a common trope in Buddhism, Buddhist teaching—the 
dharma—is a raft: it is to be used to cross over the expanse of suffering, 
but when the other shore is reached, the raft should be left behind.1  Such 
self-abrogating doctrines are not entirely unusual in Buddhist discourse, and 
indeed may be seen in other religious and philosophical traditions as well.  One 
author has creatively referred to any philosophy which aims at “its own demise” 
or employs the “dialectics of self-erasure” as uroboric.2  The image here is that of 
the uroboros, the serpent which swallows its own tail, an image found in 
medieval alchemical texts.  A paradigmatic example of an uroboric philosophy 
may be seen in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, when he states: 
 
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who 
understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he 
has climbed out through them, on them, over them.  (He must so 
to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)3 
 
The doctrinal move towards self-abrogation has of course also been referred to as 
apophasis.  Michael Sells explains that: 
 
Apophasis can mean “negation,” but its etymology suggests a 
meaning that more precisely characterizes the discourse in 
question: apo phasis (un-saying or speaking-away). . . . Any 
saying (even a negative saying) demands a correcting 
proposition, an unsaying.4 
 
In these terms, an apophatic discourse is one which ultimately abrogates, 
negates, or “unspeaks” itself.  Apophasis is often understood to be a technique 
                                                 
1  For example, in the Alagaddūpama Sutta the Buddha states, “So I have shown you the     
   Dhamma is similar to a raft, being for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose     
   of grasping”; see tr. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Middle Length  
   Discourses of the Buddha (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995), p. 229. 
2  John Visvader, “The Use of Paradox in Uroboric Philosophies,” Philosophy East and West  
   28 (1978), p. 455. 
3  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. C.K. Ogden (London: Routledge  
   & Kegan Paul, 1955), p. 189. 
4  Michael A. Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,  
   1994), pp. 2-3. 
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employed by negative theology, a theology which “denies that the transcendent 
can be named or given attributes.”5  The Russian philosopher Nicolas Berdyaev, 
however, defines apophasis as “knowledge in the process of discarding all 
notions and determinations.”6  On this account apophasis is not understood to be 
a technique for indirectly approaching an ineffable absolute, but is, rather, a form 
of discourse which aims to “speak-away” all forms of discourse, including its 
own.  For the purposes of this paper, I will understand an apophatic discourse or 
doctrine as one which makes such a self-abrogating move through employing the 
“dialectics of self-erasure,” and I will use the term apophasis(B) to refer to this 
particular form of apophasis.7  In this paper I will offer some reflections on one 
instance of apophasis(B) in a specific Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrinal treatise, 
known as the Madhyāntavibhāga (“Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes,” 
ca. fourth century CE).  I will attempt to formally distinguish such apophatic(B) 
doctrines from doctrines of ineffability, and consider what apophatic(B) doctrines 
might contribute to the impasse regarding “truth” which characterizes certain 
approaches to the comparative philosophy of religion.  Since this paper is 
intended as a contribution to the comparative philosophy of religion, I will begin 
with a few remarks on the nature of that enterprise. 
 
On the Comparative Philosophy of Religion 
  
The comparative philosophy of religion may be understood to encompass a 
number of different tendencies in the interpretation and analysis of non-Western 
philosophico-religious systems.  Perhaps in its most basic sense, the comparative 
philosophy of religion refers to the project of comparing non-Western 
philosophy (philosophies, philosophers, philosophical texts, concepts, theories, 
etc.) to Western philosophy.  In the present context this would mean conducting 
nuanced and philologically rigorous comparative studies of Buddhist philosophy 
alongside Western philosophy.  Such a project might be carried out for the 
purposes of identifying patterns in form (forms of reasoning and argumentation) 
and/or content (concepts and theories, e.g., of God, the self, etc.) among the 
differing philosophical traditions.  Wilhelm Halbfass points out that a 
comparative approach to the study of religion has a long and distinguished 
history in the Western tradition: 
 
In the days of their early historians like Herodotus, the Greeks 
compared their own traditions with those of the Orient; al-Bīrūnī 
and others compared the Hindus with the Greeks and with their 
own Muslim tradition; and deists like Herbert of Cherbury 
compared various religious traditions in order to determine their 
universally valid common denominators.8 
                                                 
5  Ibid., p. 2. 
6  Nicolas Berdyaev, Solitude and Society, tr. George Reavey (London: Geoffrey Bles,  
   Centenary Press, 1938), p. 33. 
7   The use of the superscript (B) is intended to indicate that I am using Berdyaev’s  
   definition of apophasis, especially as applied to Buddhist discourse. 
8  Wilhelm Halbfass, “India and the Comparative Method,” Philosophy East and West 35  
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Halbfass also indicates, however, that “comparison as such does not appear as an 
explicit, consciously utilized method” until the end of the eighteenth century, 
and was more clearly formulated in the nineteenth century.9  And the idea of 
applying the comparative method specifically to the study of philosophy became 
more widespread after P. Masson-Oursel’s La philosophie comparée (published in 
French in 1923, and in English in 1926, with the title Comparative Philosophy).10 
  
Whether or not such comparative projects ought to be carried out—and if so, in 
what way—is of course open to debate.  According to one line of critique, the 
categories employed in comparing diverse systems tend to be rigidly imposed, 
resulting in a loss of nuance which may be fundamental to the philosophical 
doctrines, texts, or systems being interpreted.  Nevertheless comparative 
research is an important step in developing typologies or classification schemes 
for forms of philosophy.  And in any approach to the philosophy of religion, at 
least a minimal classification scheme is unavoidable: judgments regarding just 
what phenomena are to be considered to fall under the rubric of “philosophy” or 
“religion” are predicated upon prior determinations regarding just what the 
parameters of these concepts are understood to be.  And as J. Z. Smith points out, 
these parameters are formulated from the perspective of Western scholarship: 
 
“Religion” is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars 
for their intellectual purposes and therefore is theirs to define.  It 
is a second-order, generic concept that plays the same role in 
establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as 
“language” plays in linguistics or “culture” plays in 
anthropology.  There can be no disciplined study of religion 
without such a horizon.11 
 
Classifying phenomena—at least in some preliminary way—is necessary to any 
approach to the study of phenomena, and the comparative analysis of 
phenomena is an important stage in their classification.  And even if—according 
                                                                                                                         
   (1985), p. 3. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Ibid., p. 4.  Note that while Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion discusses non-
Western traditions, it does so in terms of the architectonic of Hegel’s system.  Hodgson 
points out that Hegel’s “threefold division of the philosophy of religion reflects this 
logical structure (concept of religion, determinate religion [including Buddhism], 
consummate religion [viz., Christianity]), as do the subdivisions of each of these main 
parts” (Peter C. Hodgson, “Logic, History, and Alternative Paradigms in Hegel’s 
Interpretation of the Religions,” Journal of Religion 68 [1988], p. 5).  Regarding Hegel’s 
views on comparative philosophy of religion, Halbfass comments that “European 
thought, as Hegel sees it, cannot return to Oriental or Indian thought, and they cannot 
be equated or paralleled with one another.  They are not on the same level and cannot 
be compared in the full sense of the word 'comparison'” (Halbfass, “India and the 
Comparative Method,” p. 8). 
11  Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” in Mark C. Taylor (ed.), Critical  
   Terms for Religious Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 281-282. 
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to certain self-abrogating apophatic(B) discourses at least—classification schemes 
are ultimately to be left behind, this can only be achieved by starting within the 
scheme itself (within the “disciplinary horizon” in Smith’s terms), a scheme at 
least partially constituted by comparative analyses of phenomena.  Hence 
employing at least some typology or classification scheme seems to be 
indispensable, even if only for the purposes of critique. 
  
According to another line of thought, the comparative philosophy of religion 
means studying non-Western philosophy—here, Buddhist philosophy—with an 
acute awareness of the linguistic, conceptual, theoretical, and cultural 
presuppositions through which we engage in such study.  We cannot help but 
approach non-Western traditions comparatively—at least for those of us who 
were educated primarily in a Western cultural environment, through Western 
languages, Western regimes of education, traditions of thought, etc.  On this 
account, being comparative is in some sense a precondition for our approach to 
Buddhist philosophy.  Matthew Kapstein states: 
 
[A]s Dilthey taught us long ago, understanding must be ever 
constituted on the basis of prior understanding, and to step 
altogether out of our skins is an impossibility for us.  If we 
cannot eliminate the conceptual background engendered by our 
time, place, and personal circumstances, we can, however, with 
sufficient care, discern some of the ways in which our vision is at 
once constrained and enabled by it.12 
 
In these terms, any approach to Buddhist thought is intrinsically comparative, 
and we become more open to allowing Buddhist thought to disclose itself to the 
extent that we make our linguistic, conceptual, and cultural dispositions clearer 
to ourselves.  B. K. Matilal adds that “anyone who wants to explain and translate 
systematically from Indian philosophical writings into a European language will, 
knowingly or unknowingly, be using the method of 'comparative philosophy.'”13  
Hence engaging in self-reflexive comparative analyses of one’s own 
philosophical presuppositions vis-à-vis the presuppositions of, say, Buddhist 
philosophical discourse, is a necessary preliminary for any rigorous 
interpretation of Buddhist thought.  Furthermore, through making our own 
philosophical commitments clearer to ourselves, the self-reflexive practice of the 
comparative philosophy of religion might open a way for actual philosophical 
engagement with non-Western systems of thought, and allow for the possibility 
of shifting our own approach to philosophy itself. 
  
Some have extrapolated from the comparative philosophy of religion into the 
domain of cross-cultural philosophy of religion.  Cross-cultural philosophy of 
                                                 
12  Matthew Kapstein, “What Is Buddhist Philosophy?,” Reason’s Traces: Identity and  
  Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Thought (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001),  
  p. 3. 
13  B. K. Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (The  
  Hague: Mouton, 1971), p. 13. 
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religion refers to the project not of comparing different traditions of thought, but 
of bringing them into conversation with one another.  Jay Garfield states that 
cross-cultural philosophical understanding: 
 
[I]s actualized in the interaction between historically situated 
readers and texts, and between interlocutors.  This is no less true 
of inter-traditional understanding than it is of intra-traditional 
understanding.  Only by engaging in such actual interactions can 
we hope to benefit. . . And in dialogue the dynamic interplay of 
our horizons can yield a perspective genuinely responsive to the 
presuppositions and insights of each.14 
 
Garfield discusses the interlocking hermeneutic circles of text, tradition, and 
reader, and recommends the “radically pragmatic turn” of not focusing on texts 
as the abstract objects of “disembodied minds,” but engaging with texts “in-
being-read, or in-being-explained.”15  Understood in this way, we might view 
cross-cultural philosophy of religion as an extension and further transformation 
of comparative philosophy of religion.  Through such open-ended conversations 
across traditions we maintain the hope of arriving at the pragmatist ideal of 
truth, namely the “opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who 
investigate”16—a hope which must remain the very precondition for philosophy 
as such.  In a previous paper I explored one way in which semiotics (theory of 
signs)—especially in the tradition of Charles Sanders Peirce—might be brought 
into conversation with certain strands of Buddhist thought.17  In the next section, 
I will extend some of the ideas developed in that earlier paper in order to 
introduce some background themes necessary for understanding the 
Madhyāntavibhāga’s apophatic(B) doctrine. 
 
Three Entrances to Nirvāa 
  
According to a Buddhist doctrine found even in the Pāli canon—the canonical 
collection containing some of Buddhism’s earliest extant texts—there are three 
entrances to nirvāṇa: emptiness, wishlessness, and signlessness (śūnyatā, 
apraihita, and animitta).  We may briefly explain these three as follows: one may 
attain the highest goal through realizing that all phenomena are empty of 
inherent nature (emptiness), through relinquishing any form of craving for 
phenomena (wishlessness), and through eliminating any signs of phenomena 
(signlessness).  In his Buddhist Thought in India Edward Conze offers an extended 
discussion of these three entrances to nirvāṇa, or “doors to deliverance.”  He 
                                                 
14  Jay L. Garfield, “Temporality and Alterity: Dimensions of Hermeneutic Distance,”  
Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 250. 
15 Ibid., pp. 237 and 233. 
16  Charles Sanders Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” in James Hoopes (ed.), Peirce  
on Signs: Writings on Semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1991), p. 177. 
17  Mario D’Amato, “The Semiotics of Signlessness: A Buddhist Doctrine of Signs,”  
   Semiotica 147 (2003), pp. 185-207. 
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states, “It will be noted that the concentration on emptiness concerns ontology, 
wishlessness pertains to the volitional sphere, and the signless belongs to the 
domain of epistemology.”18  While this is a simple sketch, for the present 
purposes we may consider it to be not far off the mark—although I would 
characterize discourse on wishlessness as concerning philosophical psychology, 
and discourse on signlessness as concerning theoretical semiotics.19 
  
Conze provides a synthetic account of how signlessness is understood in 
Buddhism, describing semiosis in terms of a three-stage process of noting the 
sign, recognizing the object to which the sign refers, and becoming volitionally 
engaged with the object.  He states: 
 
The task is to bring the process back to the initial point, before 
any “superimpositions” have distorted the actual and initial 
datum.  The seemingly innocuous phraseology of the formula 
which describes the restraint of the senses [through the 
concentration on signlessness] opens up vast philosophical 
vistas, and involves a huge philosophical programme which is 
gradually worked out over the centuries in the Abhidharma and 
Prajñāpāramitā.20 
 
According to Buddhist semiotics, there is a significant sense in which semiosis 
itself is systematically deceptive, binding one further to cyclic existence.  
According to Buddhist metaphysics, conditioned phenomena—phenomena 
which comprise “the world,” including whatever we refer to as “the self”—are 
radically impermanent and without inherent nature or essence.  Signs, on the 
other hand, function to posit stable entities where there are none, affixing 
inherent natures onto hypostatized existents.  While phenomena are in flux, 
signs posit enduring objects.  While phenomena are without essence, signs posit 
essential natures.  Signs point to a realm of stable referents, but the purported 
“objects” to which they refer are always on the move.  So coming to a proper 
understanding of semiosis, and bringing about its end or terminus through a 
radical transformation, is understood in Buddhist traditions to be one of the very 
“doors to deliverance.” 
 
In the quote cited above, Conze identifies signlessness as a significant dimension 
of Buddhist thought.  Far from viewing Buddhist semiotics as ancillary to the 
                                                 
18  Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,  
   1962), p. 68. 
19 According to Buddhist doctrine these three entrances are understood to be intrinsically  
related to one another, and to the entire edifice of Buddhist theory and practice.  For 
example, the Visuddhimagga (an important Theravāda Buddhist doctrinal compendium) 
states that emptiness pertains to absence of self, wishlessness to unsatisfactoriness, and 
signlessness to impermanence, wherein absence of self, unsatisfactoriness, and 
impermanence are viewed as the universal characteristics of all conditioned 
phenomena; see tr. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, The Path of Purification: Visuddhimagga (Seattle: 
BPS Pariyatti Editions, 1999), pp. 680-681. 
20  Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 65. 
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history and structure of Buddhist thought, Conze interprets it as a fundamental 
aspect of the project of Buddhism, playing a role both in the Abhidharma—the 
earliest fully articulated systems of Buddhist philosophy—and in the 
Prajñāpāramitā or “Perfection of Wisdom” sūtras—the earliest genre of 
Mahāyāna sūtra-literature.  This is understandable insofar as according to certain 
strands of Buddhist thought, the fundamental cause of suffering, or the 
fundamental problem that must be overcome, is some form of conceptualization 
(sajñā), conceptual discrimination (vikalpa), conceptual construction (parikalpa), 
or conceptual proliferation (prapañca)21—in short, the fundamental problem is 
some form of semiosis. 
 
The Middle Way 
 
We now turn to a brief reflection on a passage from the Madhyāntavibhāga, a 
passage that may be understood as offering an apophatic(B) doctrine.  Before 
citing and commenting on the passage, a few remarks on the text itself are in 
order.  The Madhyāntavibhāga is a Buddhist treatise belonging to an early stratum 
of the Yogācāra tradition, one of the main philosophical schools of Mahāyāna 
Buddhism.  The text was composed in Sanskrit probably ca. the fourth century 
CE, and while I would not characterize the Madhyāntavibhāga as a text of 
philosophy, I think it’s clear that the text engages with a number of philosophical 
concerns.  As with other Mahāyāna texts, the Madhyāntavibhāga’s ultimate 
soteriological goal is the attainment of buddhahood, an attainment which is 
understood in the Yogācāra tradition as a non-conceptual awareness (nirvikalpa-
jñāna).  The text presents the path to buddhahood, and the text’s sub-
commentator, Sthiramati (sixth century CE), offers an explanation of the 
structure of the text.  According to Sthiramati, the text begins with a discussion 
of mental affliction and purification in terms of the concepts of “unreal 
imagination” and “emptiness” (Chapter 1).  Then in the next two chapters the 
text discusses mental affliction in terms of a set of specific categories of 
“obstructions” (Chapter 2)—mental factors which “obstruct” sentient beings 
from seeing the way things really are and attaining liberation—and mental 
purification in terms of the proper vision of “reality” (Chapter 3)—a vision 
obtained through purification from the obstructions.  In order to elucidate the 
method of purification, the text then identifies the mental “antidotes” (Chapter 
4), and their proper cultivation.  Finally, since the path discussed thus far is 
common to all Buddhists, including followers of the Hīnayāna (lit., “inferior 
vehicle”), the text addresses the distinctive features of the Mahāyāna (lit., “great 
vehicle”) (Chapter 5). 
 
I broadly agree with Matthew Kapstein’s and Dan Arnold’s point that in trying 
to understand just what these Buddhist thinkers are up to in composing such 
texts, there’s much to be learned from Pierre Hadot’s interpretations of the 
classical Western tradition in terms of “philosophy as a way of life.”22  According 
                                                 
21 Paul Williams, “Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka,”  
   Journal of Indian Philosophy 8 (1980), pp. 1-45. 
22  See Kapstein, “What Is Buddhist Philosophy?,” pp. 3-26; and Dan Arnold, Mīmāsakas  
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to Hadot, in this tradition “philosophy was a way of life, both in its exercise and 
effort to achieve wisdom, and in its goal, wisdom itself.  For real wisdom does 
not merely cause us to know: it makes us 'be' in a different way.”23  Doing 
philosophy, on this account, is itself a form of “spiritual exercise.”  As Arnold has 
pointed out, we might most helpfully see the concepts and categories, the 
accounts and arguments, offered in Buddhist doctrinal treatises not as detachable 
pieces that might be employed in other contexts for other purposes, but rather as 
part of the enculturation of a certain form of “mental discourse” (mano-jalpa), 
internalizing a Buddhist vision of things—a point which appropriately echoes 
the self-understanding of Buddhist doctrinal treatises as directed towards 
attaining wisdom produced first through hearing, then reflecting upon, and 
finally cultivating the teachings.  On this reading, Buddhist philosophy is to be 
understood as a form of Buddhist practice. 
  
Returning to our text, we may now consider the specific passage.  The text reads: 
 
The extreme of conceptually discriminating (vikalpa) truth 
(samyaktva) and falsity (mithyātva) is due to imagining the 
analysis of existence (bhūta-pratyavekā) in terms of true and 
false.  To avoid these two extremes, there is the example of a fire 
and two sticks.  A fire is generated by two sticks that are not 
themselves aflame; but when [the fire] has been generated, the 
two sticks are consumed.  Similarly, the true noble faculty of 
wisdom [i.e., nonconceptual wisdom] is generated by an untrue 
analysis of existence; but when [the noble faculty of wisdom] has 
been generated, the analysis of existence is itself analyzed 
(vibhāvayati).  But the untrue analysis of existence should not be 
[simply] characterized as false, since it is conducive to what is 
true.24 
 
This passage occurs in the context of a discussion of how the Mahāyāna properly 
distinguishes the “middle” through avoiding a number of pairs of “extreme” 
views25—a discussion which elucidates a brief section of an important Mahāyāna 
sūtra, the Kāśyapa-parivarta.  It is of course a common theme in Buddhist 
discourse that the dharma is the “middle way” that avoids the extremes of 
sensory indulgence and extreme asceticism, eternalism and annihilationism, etc.  
The Madhyāntavibhāga takes up this theme and offers a new twist, articulating 
that in the Mahāyāna all conceptual extremes are avoided through non-
conceptualization.  In fact, the term “middle way” (madhyamā pratipad) is itself 
                                                                                                                         
   and Mādhyamikas against the Buddhist Epistemologists (University of Chicago, Ph.D. diss.,  
   2002), pp. 314-330. 
23 Pierre Hadot, “Philosophy as a Way of Life,” Philosophy as a Way of Life, tr. Michael  
   Chase (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1995), p. 265. 
24 The translation is my own; for the Sanskrit text, see Gadjin Nagao (ed.),  
   Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāya (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), comm. ad chap. 5,  
   v. 26. 
25  Ibid., chap. 5, vv. 23-26. 
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glossed as “nonconceptual awareness” (nirvikalpa-jñāna):26 the middle between 
any pair of extreme views is achieved through the absence of 
conceptualization—wherein one no longer conceptualizes either of the two 
extremes at all.  For our purposes, what is particularly interesting about the 
present passage is that it characterizes both truth and falsity as extremes, 
extremes that will be left behind (or consumed) by the (flames of the) “true noble 
faculty of wisdom.”  But this nonconceptual wisdom is itself arrived at through 
the Buddhist analysis of the way things really are.  So while the Buddhist 
analysis of existence entails making a distinction between truth and falsity, when 
this analysis is carried through to its ultimate conclusion—to the attainment of 
the wisdom of buddhahood—the Buddhist analysis of things is itself consumed, 
along with truth and falsity.  In short, because the fundamental awareness of a 
buddha is understood to be nonconceptual—not engaging with concepts and 
language—the attainment of buddhahood precludes the possibility of positing 
truth.  But shouldn’t such a text concern itself with truth?  Should all this be 




It is generally understood that insofar as one is engaging in the philosophical, 
rather than strictly just philological, study of texts from a non-Western tradition—
insofar as one is engaging in the comparative philosophy of religion—one should 
be concerned with the question of truth.  While philological rigor is certainly a 
precondition for such studies, it is not the end of philosophical analysis: even 
after one is satisfied that one has arrived at a proper understanding of the sense 
of the text, there is still the question of whether one takes the text’s claims to be 
true.  But the question of truth is not easily resolved.  Arnold offers a particularly 
succinct account of the “problem of truth” when he states: 
 
What sense are we to make of the fact that a great many 
seemingly rational persons have ardently held, as really true, 
religious beliefs that are often mutually exclusive?  That question 
becomes especially acute when we realize that our answer to it 
cannot consist in simply jettisoning the idea of truth . . . for that 
is an idea that itself is necessarily presupposed by our work as 
scholars.27 
 
In addressing this question, Arnold relies on a distinction between justification 
and truth: while justification pertains to “the various circumstances in which a 
person might be constituted as someone for whom certain beliefs are rationally 
held,” the issue of “[h]ow and why the beliefs in question were thus developed 
is, however, logically independent of whether or not they might be true.”28  
                                                 
26  Ibid., comm. ad chap. 5, v. 23. 
27  Dan Arnold, “Justification and Truth, Relativism and Pragmatism: Reflections on  
   Indian Philosophy and Its Lessons for Religious Studies” (unpublished paper, 2006), p 1. 
28 Dan Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief (New York: Columbia University Press,  
   2005), p. 213. 
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Through employing such a distinction, we might “retain the relativist’s 
recognition that many different (even mutually exclusive) beliefs might alike be 
rationally held, but only if we also recognize that this point becomes incoherent 
if understood as concerning the truth of beliefs,” and “appreciate, moreover, that 
the possibility that [religious persons’] justified beliefs are really true may never 
finally be eliminated.”29  If Arnold’s distinction is the right one to adopt, then the 
conclusions of any comparative philosophy of religion can only inform us about 
modes of justification, and cannot finally determine the truth of the claims 
discussed.  We may for example note that Buddhist thinkers and Western 
empiricist philosophers offer similar accounts of the absence of self, and deploy 
similar arguments in their defense, although all this could never in the end tell us 
whether it is indeed true that there is no (essential, unchanging) self.  But what is 
true?  Shouldn’t philosophy be concerned with the truth of the matter? 
 
In connection with the distinction between justification and truth, we might also 
consider Arnold’s comments regarding Hadot’s approach to the interpretation of 
classical philosophy as a form of spiritual practice, “philosophy as a way of life.”  
Arnold points out that such an approach leads us to see that Buddhist 
philosophical discourse is based upon certain axiological commitments—certain 
commitments to a hierarchy of values, values largely presupposed by Buddhist 
philosophy rather than argued for.  He calls our attention to 
 
[T]he fact that these different traditions of discourse all make 
clear the extent to which they presuppose various (and 
sometimes mutually exclusive) axiological commitments, and 
the fact that the ideal readers envisaged by these works will be 
those who share these commitments. . . . [T]hose who engaged 
religiously with the discourses . . . were doing something, were 
performing some practice. . . . [and] none of the arguments . . . 
surveyed provides good reasons for choosing to hold the beliefs 
or undertake the practices in question.30 
 
But where does this leave us with respect to the question of truth?  Where does 
that leave the comparative philosophy of religion?  Are we at an impasse, unable 
to finally adjudicate between competing systems of values? 
  
It may be appropriate to characterize the present situation in terms of the 
“postmodern condition.”  Jean-François Lyotard defines the postmodern 
condition as “incredulity toward metanarratives,” and states that “the 
obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most 
notably, [to] the crisis of metaphysical philosophy.”31  Considering the problems 
                                                 
29 Ibid., pp. 216 and 218. 
30  Arnold, Mīmāsakas and Mādhyamikas against the Buddhist Epistemologists, pp. 314-315. 
31  Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, tr. Geoff  
   Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p.  
   xxiv. 
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associated with the legitimation of science, Lyotard states that the language game 
of science: 
 
[L]eaves behind the metaphysical search for a first proof of 
transcendental authority as a response to the question: “How do 
you prove the proof?” or, more generally, “Who decides the 
conditions of truth?”  It is recognized that the conditions of 
truth, in other words, the rules of the game of science, are 
immanent in that game, that they can only be established within 
the bonds of a debate that is already scientific in nature, and that 
there is no other proof that the rules are good than the consensus 
extended to them by the experts.32 
 
While Lyotard concerns himself with the “language game” of science, we might 
transpose his account to our own domain, to describe the issues raised here in 
the comparative philosophy of religion.  Without recourse to some 
metanarrative, is it really possible to finally adjudicate between different 
religious language games, e.g., the language games of Yogācāra Buddhism, 
Gnosticism, or Lacanian psychoanalysis?  Have we conceded the death of 
philosophy?  Have we conceded that in the postmodern condition, metaphysics 
can only be replaced with “post-mortem” philosophy? 
 
Apophasis: Philosophy as Therapy 
  
Considering the impasse with respect to the question of truth in the comparative 
philosophy of religion as highlighted above, we might reflect on whether 
apophatic(B) doctrines might contribute to a resolution of the problem, or offer 
another “way out.”  It is first necessary, however, to distinguish apophatic(B) 
doctrines from doctrines of ineffability.33  I will attempt to formally differentiate 
the two forms of doctrine in terms of a Peircean model of semiosis.  According to 
Peirce’s tripartite model of semiosis, three elements are necessary for semiosis to 
occur: the sign, the object, and the interpretant.  Briefly, the sign is the 
representation, the object is what is represented, and the interpretant is the 
meaning of the representation—what Peirce defines as “the proper significate 
outcome of a sign.”34  In these terms, a doctrine of ineffability should be 
understood to primarily address the relation between sign and object: an 
ineffability claim is a claim that some object x is unable to be expressed, a claim 
                                                 
32  Ibid., p. 29. 
33   I should point out here that ineffability certainly plays a role in Buddhist discourse;  
e.g., see José Ignacio Cabezón, “Ineffability and the Silence of the Buddha,” Buddhism 
and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), chap. 9; 
and Ben-Ami Scharfstein, Ineffability: The Failure of Words in Philosophy and Religion 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), pp. 90-97.  Numerous other studies also examine the role 
of ineffability in Buddhism; my aim in this paper, however, is to call attention to a 
different aspect of Buddhist discourse. 
34   See Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (eds.), Collected Papers of  
   Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958), vol. 5,  
   para. 473. 
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that the sign cannot properly refer to the object.  An apophatic(B) doctrine, on the 
other hand, should be understood to primarily address the relation between sign 
and interpretant: an apophatic(B) doctrine indicates that the proper 
understanding of the doctrine—the interpretant or meaning of the doctrine, the 
doctrine’s “proper significate outcome”—entails a realization that the doctrine 
must ultimately “unspeak” itself, that the doctrine does not function as a 
description of the “way things really are,” but rather is only an instrument or 
means to some further end: the end of “discarding all notions and 
determinations.”35  It is certainly the case that doctrines of ineffability and 
apophatic(B) doctrines both involve all three elements of Peirce’s model of 
semiosis: the interpretant of a doctrine of ineffability is that the doctrine is unable 
to properly signify the object, and the object of an apophatic(B) doctrine is the 
doctrinal discourse itself.  However, doctrines of ineffability are primarily 
directed towards the sign/object relation; that is to say, they primarily concern 
the domain of semantics.  Apophatic(B) doctrines, on the other hand, are 
primarily directed towards the sign/interpretant relation; they primarily concern 
the domain of pragmatics.  An apophatic(B) doctrine does not point out that 
ultimate reality (or the ultimate nature of reality, or “the way things really are”) 
is ineffable.  Rather, an apophatic(B) doctrine aims to effect a shift in the status of 
the given doctrinal discourse itself, and alter the practitioner’s relation to that 
discourse.  In short, the goal of apophasis(B) is to “unspeak” itself, to place the 
doctrinal discourse under “self-erasure.” 
  
The Buddhist tendency towards apophasis(B) may be seen in a number of places 
in Buddhist discourse.  The tendency may be seen, for example, in the trope of 
the dharma as a raft, the view of the dharma as giving up all views, the claim 
that Buddhist doctrine is like one illusory king defeating another, the statement 
found in many Mahāyāna sūtras that the Buddha never uttered a word, the 
Madhyamaka account of the ultimate goal as the cessation of all conceptual 
proliferation (sarva-prapañca-upaśama),36 or the Madhyāntavibhāga’s claim that 
when the Buddhist analysis of the nature of things has done its work it will itself 
be consumed in the flames of non-conceptualization.  In the passage from the 
Madhyāntavibhāga discussed above, for example, the Buddhist characterization of 
the way things really are is understood as an attempt to end all such 
characterizations, including its own—offering an account of the way things 
really are that will terminate any accounting for the way things really are.  All of 
this seems to quite clearly imply that when the goal is attained, even Buddhism 
itself will not ultimately be taken to be true: when awakening is attained, 
Buddhist doctrine is to be left behind.  In the end, Buddhism should serve as a 
                                                 
35  Berdyaev, Solitude and Society, p. 33. 
36   Kapstein states, “As the Madhyamaka teaching of emptiness, however, is sometimes  
said to dispense with all expressed tenets, even this one, more nuanced readings favor 
finding here a type of skepticism, specifically a skeptical view of the referential capacity 
of language and conceptual activity.  None of this seems to me to be wrong . . . 
'emptiness' cannot be understood primarily in propositional, or 'theoretical' terms; 
rather it fundamentally determines one’s orientation to the Buddha’s salvific project” 
(Kapstein, “What Is Buddhist Philosophy?,” pp. 13-14). 
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means of achieving the realization of signlessness, an attainment which dissolves 
the possibility for affirming any truth at all. 
  
Returning finally to the impasse regarding truth in the comparative philosophy 
of religion, I would emphasize that apophasis(B) implies a conception of 
philosophy as praxis more than theory, as more concerned with the cultivation of 
spiritual realization rather than the statement of theoretical truths.  An 
apophatic(B) doctrine may, for example, be understood in terms of Wittgenstein’s 
intuition that “All philosophy is 'Critique of language,'”37 although in offering 
such “critique” one only has recourse to language itself—a predicament which 
highlights the tension of self-abrogation driving apophatic(B) discourse.  From the 
perspective of apophatic(B) discourse, the impasse regarding truth may in itself 
serve as a clue to the nature of our entrapment with the net of views, and a hint 
that the ultimate goal entails moving beyond all views.  In these terms, 
philosophy is ultimately a form of therapy, and when the therapy has done its 
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37  Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, p. 63. 
